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n-- - -e 2 x e  C T  che spacs prq----  -i-.. elei-nenix h a s  gozcen 
.zwr:. Ltcause of the  underesti : . .at ion of what it tz.'lces t o  
60 kbese jobs. 
=or t h i s .  
spzcz propuision business, it a3;:ezrs mandator:: 2;zt we 
So so on zhe 3ase of souxZ pic.xi?-C;. a26 exserie~ce ko 
p r=ven t  re-crzzting a s i t z a t i c  - - , . J C ~  a s  w e  have LC-7. 
There are several contributing 21'acxors 
Khile it i s  tiz.3 t o  Get t5e sag o u t  c2 :?e 
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m e  1:zssn -LO be learr-zc Lrc:.. . - - I -  L - - L ~  ~. - Story is t ha t  if YOU 
l i s t e n  t o  every5ody's GZ*,-CE ;JG-L * e - ?  ._- l o s e  your ass, 
* 
O f  course there are khcs,. ..iko i i s - k e - ?  Zor f l u t e  music  
req 22iess of the m e l o C y ,  an6 =;-lis is -l:s-;arly t r u e  
i n  ::ashington, I xust s q  t o  znen . -  that -2-2 L?en;e, ra ther  
t'r.2:- the tone of the prssentccicn, car r ies  t h e  xassage. 
n-- 1, 2 zalk is  i l l u s t r z t e d  3 y  a z'cw s l i Z s s  t ha t  hzve l i t t l e  
t G  do with the  discussion bu t  are  s:?cwz t o  en ter ta in  those 
who attend these meetings p i rnar i ly  for the  cocktail  par t ies .  
INTROCUCT ION 
. 
A t  t h i s  t i n e  the Wr.-.L .ed ;LL-~ZL st:-& on the  t k resho ld  
-. L:-.-L:~ naw, wit12 t he  
pay- 
of t ransport  i n  the spc ,  erivircx:,zr--k. 
excsszioz of c r a l a t ive iy  few pey3.oad.s sucn as L -:corn, 
I czL  launched i n t o  s p x e  were S L - ~  GZ t h e i r  trzfcc-lory by 
tk-  i a n c h  vehicle, 
by zhe on-board propulsion s;73 kexs 
rc-curns w e r e  made by a r e l a t iye ly  --..L--i.or s l o w i q  \ - -  -,:he 
OL iting capsule, with aerolyfiznic braking providk; t? 
TEZ-L of the k ine t i c  enerc;.y C:-~ZXJ~. 
w h i c h  may f l y  with rnen t3is ~ E . Z T ,  srA which will l e te r  
e f f e c t  rendezvous of ael;zrat, p.yloads i n  spzce, sac? in 
C- _ _ I  mir..c: p t h  corrections were cTplied 
&en the Xerc,:;T capsule 
Ec-.pJever i.2 L 
2 
J 
* - e .  
c 
"z 
I .  
Apollo, which w i l l  perforz an -::,.r,cate series of s p x e  
8 
maneuvers, we recognize si zte:: x c t  carry s igni f icant  
propulsion capabi l i ty  in to  space for  use en t i r e ly  i n  that 
. 
environment. The time is  rapidly corning when space i s  no 
longer something we throw 2 z t s  i zco  but is an environment 
i n  which working propulsion systems w i l l  maneuver and 
t ransport  spacecraft payloads ar-2 eventczlly convey these 
pzyloads back t o  the  e a r t h ' s  ztr.-:os?hrs for Zescent to the  
surface t o  be used again. 
. O n  the launch vehicle end of the  business, Saturn I 
has demonserated the  capabili ty t o  launch paylcaes 3eavy 
enough t o  contain the spacecraft s y s t c s  - ; .  ._  LzLL:--~ - .  about. 
Furthermore, Sa turn  V, w i t h  ten-falE the p ~ y l s c i  -s:~ins 
capabi l i ty  of Saturn I follows c l o s e  behind. 
One of the issues I want t o  exzmine i s  our preparation 
t o  exploi t  t h i s  now rapidly deveioping capabi l i ty  t o  nove 
. i n ,  not j u s t  in to ,  space. The other issue i s  t o  survey 
sone of the problems being encountered presently i n  the 
spacecraft propulsion system developments and to suggesz 
factors  which may be contributing t o  t h e i r  o r i c ~ i n .  . .  
3 
I 
. - .  
I . 
L e t ' s  see how we gc-k i..jhkzE: we are ,  :-IIsko,q~ is a 
mute teacher; i t s  pat terns ,  hcdevsr, can provick k h e  molds 
for casting new answers. 
I n  October 1957, whic 'n  i s  i3resenkLy less s%al; seveli 
years ago, the  U n i t e d  States wus i r i jecz2 i n t o  s-: = -  by 
the gussians. The revelation that the atmos2:erlc -oundary 
could be pierced found the United Stztes  with severzl 
missi le  systems under developnest; some of these c;,ld 
be lashed up t o  permit the USA t o  en ter  -L:z o r ~ r t x g  - .  
And t h i s  was done. As a conseq.'eace, airncsc zL1 _ -  cL- e z l y  
. ccccest. 
space systems were adaptztLox 25 te2hxolos:T &ve lL  --:.er- _- 
for  missi le  systems. 
Nost ear ly  space missiofis could be characterized as 
impulsive propulsion missions; tha t  i s ,  whether the purpc-2 
was t o  o r b i t  a payload around the ear th ,  or pursue a pla;-.~-c, 
thk propulsion requirements were met i n  a successive se r i e s  
of stage burns, with only very minor propulsion requirexents 
a f x x  the f i r s t  several minutes cf fli2;2t. The minor 
requirements t o  maintain atti-rude, o r  t o  xzke t ra jec tory  





But not  for ever. In 1961, President Kennedy’s 
annouriceinent of the decision to land a man on t h e  surface of 
the 
space- ... aneuvering propi;- ,311 zs-s terns. The r s a - i i r e n e n t  
zo :c r.6 gently denande2 variatLa th rus t ,  s. f e z z ~ z z  unnecesszy 
- .42n estabiished the recpiremcnt fo r  ii:epenc?&le 
- .  
5 
’. 
y e a r s  of e f fo r t  had evolved i n t o  e f f i c i e n t  turbopumped and 
regeneratively-coolEd s y z  c a s  05 c c n s L 2 ~ r a k l o  coDplexity, 
o r  dec id ing  ir, favor  of new teckco;ogical &p~:roac'l?es t h a t  
emphasized systen: siriip1icit.y 2 3 ~  the szke or' e a r l y  systen 
~ r e l i a b i l i t y .  By t h a t  t ix.2,  f l i g 3 t  exgeriecce had deT.onstrzted 
Tai led under h igh  acce le ra t ions  sm2 loading, o r  al"ter 
exposure t o  space condi t ions.  Therefore or, t k e  l o g i c  t h a t  
t he  conponent which i s  not  used  cannot cause miss i sn  f a i l u r e ,  " 
t h e  new spacecraft propulsion syste:.-.s -.73i^c 6esiped: with 
b . maximurr, emphasis on s i r n 2 , l i c i t . r  =--2 rus.geC i: z i l i t y .  Z e l i & i l i t y  
e x p e r t s  sfio-+~ed hOPJ t h i s  could be v i  t h  
nee<.: 2zz isZic  re-exanination ;:? tcrxs or' t k e  deveXi@xq 
state-of-=he-ar t .  I wonder what answers  f o r  i n h e r e n t  r e l i a -  
j i l i t y  would result fron an ana lys i s  of an autonobila, for  
exanple. 
1 -  
Tke  space propuls ion systms that zre Seing ZEvelopeZ 
f o r  Gemini and Apollo use  z i t rogen  t e t r o x i i -  2s o x i d i z e r  
I -  
I ‘- 
and a s  f u e l s ,  var ious  m i n e  mixtures ,  gene ra l ly  appr;:-:ixating 
nonoinethyl hydrazine Fr. c3er;liczi c o n s t i t c t i o n .  The choice t o  
use -Ll--Pse s t o r a b l e  proge--laRiL .J:ES d i c t a t e 6  by the uncertain-  
ti.- sf s t o r i n g  t h e  c r y o 9 a i c  p o p l l a c t s  i n  space,  t h e  
1z.c: :  of 2 s u z f i c i e n t  t echno lcs i ca l  base f o r  some of t h e  
more e x o t i c  p r o p e l l a n t  cc&inz:tions, and the  gene ra i  con- 
sezTizzisn t h a t  i s  engendered Sy z p 2 l i z z t i o n  i n  a :;tanned 
fiL9k.r veh ic l e  t o  be devel3ped on a shor-, t ixe t a b l e .  
d e c i s i o n  t o  use  t h e  low perforrnance p r o p e l l a n t s  w a s  a prudent  
one, s a c r i f i c i n g  mission c a p s b i l i t y  i n  order  t o  r e a l i z e  a 
manned l u n a r  landing  w i t h i n  a decade. 
The 
I f  we eva lua te  t C e  e::texk of t h i s  s E c r i f i c e  i n  per- 
- .  - forrnance wz Z;:..Z it f&ir;y coseiy. 5.ZiiK.e l-iig’n performance 
p r o p l i a n t s  2;ay off i n  airy s t age ,  i n  appra i s ing  tk2 value of 
performance i n  s u c c e e d i q  s t q e s ,  it i s n ’ t  long beiore one 
recognizes  tha t  t h e  e f f e c t i v c  cost of each s t a g e ,  iz f l i g h t ,  
involves  the cost i nves t ed  i n  all ?receding stase.,. Thus 
where t h e  first s t a g e  i s  being considered,  with no pri- - 
s tage  cost,  what ma t t e r s  i s  sixsiy t k e  grzatest ix-.uls.- 
de l ive red  pe r  dollar of system c o s t  incliuding iauncb 
o p r r a t i o n s  costs appropr ia te  t o  the Zirst s tage .  Thcs, 
a c k ~ a ?  low F2ziormance s y s ~  czr? cornpete with 2 more 
expensive high performmce system. 
SoGstars can c o m ~ s t ~  w.L:'it? ?,ydrc.,-c---oxygen systems and it ' s 
not -:ear which should w;rL; K.-~.Z?- cf ",;?e zrs-,xr i i e s  i n  the 
extxa launch f a c i l i t y  cost  ir-y,poived in accc :L;.,odcting the 
adCLtLona1 weight and thrust  05 'c;-,e so l id  propell&Et system, 
Solid proFellant 
I n  the second stage, 3owever, each extra  poai-3 generally 
involves fron 4 t o  10  addizionai pounds i n  the f irst  stage. 
If one assumes that the systern cost pzr ?ound of hardware 
i s  the same - which is  not r ea l ly  true bEic vhic3 is not  so 
wrong as t o  change the r e s u l t  of t h i s  argument - one can see 
by inspection t h a t  perfor::.ance i s  rrany times more valuzble 
i n  the second stage than i n  the f i r s t .  The multiplication I 
cont imes  t'nrough each succeeCing stage. 
gEt t o  a possible lunar lancing stage, a pound is  worth 
By the time we 
several  hundred pounds i n  lower stage equipment, which can 
&Tount t o  enough value t o  make the i n t r i n s i c  cost  of the 
landing stage (the prc2Lsiox-i part of it) a pre t ty  small 
pa r t  of the t o t a l  investnent. Tnus we  can see t h a t  per- 
formance gains, which t rans la te  i n to  additional payload 
capzhi l i ty ,  have great  value i n  spacecraft stacjes. 
a 
. - - a  
Tor ztxampie, if h y d ~ o g e ~ - ~ : q ~ z z  > r o p l l a n t s  'w'2rs -ssed i n  
the ;-?oIlo spacecraft ,  tkzn d--e "pay Ioad"  - i n  t h i s  case 
the  mass of the  Lunar Excxrsicr, 3:oc5ale returned t o  the 
orki t ing Service Module - could 3s increased by a t  l e a s t  
50% 
inilht be worth the e n t i r e  cost of the manned lunar project ,  
I t  :.ow seems ce r t a in  tha t  the mission can be accomplished 
What i s  t h a t  worth? For a while it a3peared t h a t  
w i t h  s torable  propellants,  a lbe i t  without generccs margins. 
If we use the  c r i t e r i o n  tha t  value is proportional t o  
payload, then the  50% added payload would 3e worth half  
again the cost of the vehicle development p a r t  of the 
program. A t  some l i m i t ,  any l inear ized projection becomes 
absurd, but the  message of pqioad-performance-payofS should 
be coming througk. 
RELATIVE LAUNCH VEHICLE - SIACECRAFT PROPULSIOX STATUS 
I n  th ree  years, the United S ta tes  w i l l  be able t o  l i f t  
nearly a quarter of a m i l l i o n  pounds i n t o  orb i t .  
t e s t  equipment and launch f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  the Saturn V 
ve'nicle, designed t o  propel t h e  Apollo spacecraft i n t o  <.:. 
ear th escape t ra jec tory  Eoward the  moon, a re  under develo2- 
ment toward t h a t  schedule. A :all year e a r l i e r  the Saturn I B ,  
w i t h  a capabi l i ty  of 32,000 2c;unds i n  ear th  o r b i t  w i l l  be 
availa3le. The Sa tu rn  I, a 3 i r d  which has been overtaken 
A l l  stages, 
9 
by t;?e aavzncements of technology, e x i s t s  r i gh t  now. i n  
s p i t e  of i t s  obsolescent s t a t u s ,  i t s  f l i g h t  records have 
seriously d is tor ted  the randor: s t a t i s t i c a l l y  d is t r ibu t ion  
of success. 
:n o rb i t .  
vehicle which a l so  has lofking capabi l i ty  i n  the 20,000 
Saturn I can put 20 ,000  pounds of t rue  payload 
"he A i r  Force has under developxent the  Titan I11 
pound class.  
Se classed with the lash-ups of mil i tary inissile Eystens, 
Gemini w i l l  Be launched on T i t a n  11, which can 
as can the  Surveyor. Surveyor v i  11 
launch vehicle. 
use the  Atlas-Centaur 
While Atlas-Centaur pairs  with Surveyor, T i t m  I1 mates 
with G e m i n i ,  Saturn I B  wit> the earth-orbiting Apollo system, 
an6 Saturn V with the Apoilo lunar 
t ha t  other payloads are  n o t  being built t o  expand an2 exploi t  
the payload lo f t ing  capability. Considering the fac t  thaz 
the a t ten t ion  of propulsion people continues t o  be clrawn 
boosters and uprating of existing vehicles,  t h i s  a p e a r s  LO 
me t o  be a case of looking into the wrong end of - 2 e  telescope. 
The time is  a t  hand, it seems t o  rAe, for propulsion people 
t o  focus on the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  for expanded Gemini and Apoli.3 
journey, it i s  a p p r e n t  





I again observe t k l - 1 ~  zEie G e r r , i n i  and Apollo spacecraft 
propJision systems don't rr,,tch che so2histication of the 
3oostar vehicles. While the Saturn I second stage,  already 
Zlown, has second stage ensines producing a spec i f ic  impulse 
near four and a t h i r d  hundred pound-seconds per pound, the 
?resent spacecraft propulsion systems cannot b e t t e r  75% of 
t ha t  figure. 
It i s  a l so  observable t h a t  i n  general the booster 
engines have passed or ,  i n  the case of the Saturn V engines, 
a re  approaching t h e i r  preliminary f l i g h t  ra t ing  tes ts ,while  
the more conservative spacecraft propulsion systems have not 
ye t  arrived a t  t h a t  milepost. 
nay be expected t o  come along a t  a f a s t e r  pace than the big 
;;lhile these spacecraft engines 
aooster engine developments the f ac t  is  t h a t  they are  presently 
i n  a t a i l  chase s i tuat ion.  I think we must observe t h a t  a t  
t h i s  moment the s t a tus  of spacecraft propulsion systems under 
development lags  the  development s t a t u s  of launch vehicle 
engines and i s  additionally behind i n  performance sophistica- 
t ion.  That i s  the  area t h a t  warrants  propulsion a t ten t ion .  
I don ' t  wish t o  ixply t h a t  NASA has heen completely 
negligent i n  planning :or t h i s  expansion of spacecraft 
propulsion capabi l i t i es .  This country has a high-performance 
11 
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engine of s u i t a b l e  t h rus t  level  which has demonstrated 
th ro t t l ed  operation over a 1O:l range, and which has 
aperated a t  " idle"  t o  produce about 3 per cent of f u l l  
thrust .  NASA a l so  has technology programs t o  examine 
other high-performance propellants, with a view pa r t i cu la r ly  
20 propellants more amenable t o  long-term storage i n  the  
sFace environinent than is  hydrogen. These programs, however, 
a re  i n  a r e l a t ive ly  immature s t a tus  and a t  present funding 
leve ls  w i l l  no t  be ready for  development u n t i l  the  l a t e  s ix t i e s .  
Clearly sope foresight has been exercized. But there  i s  
presently a reluctance among NASA o f f i c i a l s  t o  exptnd the  
t i g h t l y  funded space program, Also, the NASA rnanpot.-e.r t o  
manage and control effect ively t h i s  vast  ilndertakiyL5 is  
already up t o  i t s  eyeballs i n  work, These r e s t r a i n t s  have 
held some of the  plans t o  advance the spacecraft capab i l i t i e s  
i n  abeyance. 
PACE 
It would be the  height of iapropriety t o  imply t h a t  
government planning is poor, because I believe industry is  
an accessory t o  the f ac t  t h a t  something's out of k i l t e r .  A n d  
t h a t ,  i think, i s  the pace of the elements of the program 
r e l a t i v e  t o  each other. Let ' s  examine why. 
1 2  
~ i t h  a l a t e  s t a r t  on spacscraft propulsion development 
the  Lnited States chose the conservative systems fo r  develop- 
ment i n  order t o  overtake the booster capabili ty.  
representatives representee tha t  t h i s  path assured ear ly  
success. 
vat ive systems have f a l l en  back and the projects  are  consuming 
more money than was or iginal ly  estimated. 
provides no contingencies. Accordingly, since mo;.,ey can 
flow only a t  some l i m i t e d  r a te ,  demands for greatez expendi- 
t u r e s  inevitably cause the pace of the e n t i r e  program t o  
sag and t h i s ,  I think, has augmented the  imbalance between 
launch and spacecraft capability. A s  on the race t rack,  
when the caution f l ag  is  out t'nere's no way t o  gain laps 
on the leader. 
Industry 
And ye t  the  development schedules of these conser- 
The space program 
THE PROBLEMS 
Let ' s  look a t  the  record. The record says t h a t  the 
Surveyor project  has recently cancelled the f i r s t  contract  
zo adapt an ex is t ing  on-the-shelf vernier propulsion sys:,. :. 
because of technical d i f  f i cu l t l e s .  These engines, dsed ;r 
landing the spacecraft ,  must have controlled variable t h r u s t .  
The contractor had discovered cha t  when the propulsion system 
13 
. 
was operated under cer ta in  down-throttling conditioris 
t h a t  cannot be considerea a remote poss ib i l i t y ,  the fuel  i n  
the regeneratively cooled jacket decomposes giving e r r a t i c  
t h rus t  performance a t  t he  most c r i t i c a l  time of the  f l i g h t .  
?he engine performance i s  good; i ts  l i f e  i s  f a r  beyond 
mission requirements. 
got t o  be able t o  put t .  
But, to use  a homely analogy, you've 
G e m i n i  is  having trouble i n  another directior,.  Its 
react ion control th rus te rs ,  used  for  re-entry as w 2 i i  as 
fo r  the o r b i t  and a t t i t u d e  maneuver system, have ablat ive 
chambers. Although r e s u l t s  a re  often surpr is ingly good, the 
useEul l i f e  0 2  these ablative chambers is somewhat e r r a t i c .  
This i s  a materials and fabrication control problem. 
order t o  protect  the  chamber walls and throat ,  Performance 
has been lowered. Deliveries have f a l l en  back i n  schedule. 
I n  
Apollo's programs are not quite so current. Apollo 
has s m a l l  th rus te rs  of both the ablat ive type and the  
radiat ion cooled type. 
some of the  problems being encountered are  common t o  those 
of the Gemini thrusters .  
Among the small ablat ive type chaxbers 
The radiat ion coolea reaction 
control t h r u s t e r s  used i n  both the Service Module and the  
Lunar Excursion Module occasionally experience explosions 







extremely quick response valves of these systems under 
certain conditions; t h e  system i s  designed t o  be operated 
i n  a repeated pulse mode. The f ac t  t h a t  damage i,s rare  
:oesn't console those of u s  involved, even though a redundant 
system w i l l  be aboard. 
Among the larger  spacecraft propulsion systems i n  
Apollo the problem is tha t  of obtaining and maintaining 
high performance. 
the bas i s  of performance numbers tha t  do not appear t o  be 
i n  t he  deck, 
margins t h a t  w e r e  intended t o  be available t o  the Apollo system, 
The original  proposals were bouqht on 
Performance actual ly  being measured c u t s  i n to  
THE PROBLEMS' O R I G I N  
L e t ' s  face cer ta in  facts ,  The spacecraft  propulsion 
' system requirements for  r e l i a b i l i t y  and (nominal) performance 
are  f a r  more c r i t i c a l  than for mi l i ta ry  weapons where a 
moderately high success r a t i o  is adequate. Contractors 
have, i n  my opinion, fa i led  to  appreciate the difference i n  
requirements for  space systems and mi l i ta ry  systems. I n  
the absence of any standardized program p ro f i l e  - which 
inc identa l ly  I believe t o  be a necessity for  f u t u r e  develop- 
ment program bidding - the industry has used i t s  pr ior  
experience i n  developing mil i tary systems t o  project  scheduies 
15 
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and costs  fo r  spacecraft propulsion, and i n  i t s  anxiety 
t o  par t ic ipa te  i n  the program and i t s '  proceeds, it has 
squeezed the  resu l t .  
space business and the  government has displayed i t s  naivete 
i n  accepting such proposals from industry. The r e s u l t  
has been overruns i n  cost  estimates of two and three-fold, 
with concomitant program schedule s l i p s  which r e s u l t  
ind i rec t ly  i n  s ac r i f i ce s  and deferment of the new programs 
w h i c h  should log ica l ly  begin now i f  w e  a r e  t o  make the most 
of our capabili ty.  
Admittedly w e ' r e  a l l  new i n  t h i s  
It is in te res t ing  t o  note t h a t  the r a t i o  
of f i n a l  t o  o r ig ina l ly  estimated cost i n  these projects  
s e e m s  t o  converge oniQ, the natural  base of logarithms. 
Sincee f a l l s  out of i n f i n i t e  series i n  several  suprisingly 
d i f f e ren t  forms there  may be some mathematical logic  for  
approaching t h i s  r a t i o  i n  a se r i e s  of contract  renegotiations; 
however, I contend t h a t  a sound contract  expressing and cover- 
ing the  e n t i r e  development task t o  be accomplished should be 
possible t o  write, i n  which case a long series of renegotia- 
t i ons  w i l l  be unnecessary. 
SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS 
To do so w i l l  require on the  p a r t  of the  government the 
development and f u l l  u t i l i z a t i o n  of technically expert 
people t o  determine the program requirement, consider the  
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a l te rna t ives ,  judge the realism of bids i n  terms of e f f o r t  
and equipment requirements, ana survey, gauge, and adjust  
program progress. On  t h e  part  of industry it w i l l  require 
an honest technical study of the prccedures necessary t o  
accomplish the  job, and forxal discipl ining of manpower 
e f f o r t  t o  follow those procedures without waste motion. 
L e t ' s  s top kidding ourselves - the cheapest way t o  r u n  a 
program is  t o  do it r igh t ,  ra ther  than t o  do it cheap and 
then do it over. Ignorance may have i t s  excuse buc, t h e r e ' s  . 
none €or repeating e r rors  i n  procedure. 
Ful l  u t i l i z a t i o n  of capable t a l en t  vi11 require tha t  
we avoid a sociological problea t h a t  ex i s t s  i n  various 
degrees, both i n  industry and i n  the government, az i n  
f ac t ,  internationally.  I t ' s  unfortunate t h a t  organization 
charts  a re  s e t  up with people ident i f ied  i n  boxes. Zhere 
is  a tendency for  people t o  go t o  work and coxle Sack home 
through the  top of the  box. T7As keeps management channels 
d i r e c t  and simple. B u t  it also fos te rs  a modern-Gay feudaiisrn 
t h a t  not  only f rus t r a t e s  max i r ium t a l en t  u t i l i z a t i o n  b u t  af ter ,  
limizs the work t h a t  can be handled properly. The problem 









The government owes itself and the industry an edu- 
cation. Education will save effort, which is money. 
Dealing with the industry from the government’s side 
for six years convinces me that there is a serious techno- 
logicirl gap between what is being explored by research 
workers and what can be reduced to a sound set of criteria 
or specifications. The exigencies of the present programs 
have usurped much of the funding required to fill that gap. 
But if we are to get up and go into space with logical 
follow-ons to Surveyor, Gemini, and Apollo, we need more 
than program office studies. From my point of view these 
studies are often carried out simply to elevate a preconceived 
notion to a foregone conclusion, and while they have some 
merit in surveying possible mission alternatives, what it 
really takes to develop new equipment can only be judged 
from a sound technological base- 
proof of the validity of new concepts but developers need 
Not only do we need 
good experimental data information. Before asking for 
proposals to develop major pieces of expensive equipment 
w e  need engineering experience to judge the technical 
diZ3culties underlying the specifications, and a sound 
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is  XG qdes t ion  that  a sound t echn ica l  base and su r ' f i c i en t  
Avancecl experimental  d e v e l o p x n t  work to neasure t h e  
- , rac t ica l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of a new endeavor w i l l  pay f o r  
F k s e l r '  i n  t i m e  and funds saves Zuring t h e  course of t h e  
G e v e l o p e n t  of the new equipment. Even Arnold Palmer plays 
t h e  course be fo re  t h e  tournament. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Las t ly ,  1 would l i k e  t o  i n j e c t  ar, o p k i n i s t i c  note .  
Ky comments are intended t o  exzmine what c a s e d  t r o u b l e  
w i t h  t h e  hope t h a t  t h e s e  probiexs are behind u s  if we l e a r n  
f r o m  23e:a. I n  s p i t e  of s0v.e t r o u b l e ,  g r e a t  progress  h a s  
Seen rnade i n  assembling a machine - a t e a m  of governiicnt 
l e a d e r s ,  u n i v e r s i t y ,  government and indus t ry  r e sea rc%ers ,  
and indus t ry  f a b r i c a t o r s  (hardware, t h a t  i s )  wi th  a2pro- 
z x i a t e  f ' a c i l i t i e s  and equipment. I t  has  taken  a while t o  
3eco:x.e accustomed t o  t h e  response, t h e  fee l  of t h i s  tre- 
xendous rmchine we've cranked up. Vith a liCL- LL-z adjustrnerst 
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- . 2 )  i4.r . Buckley, w a t c h  oar t rzcks f 
IJc. Buckley i s  Direc tor  of the O f f i c e  0: Trackinc; 2)  
and D a t a  A c p i s i t i o n  f o r  NASA. 
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